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ContraCt in philosophiCal history
Contract is a strange thing. It is doubly strange 
because it is at the same time so familiar – it is all 
around us, the whole time.
 Gaius the Roman, ‘Our Gaius’, who lived in the 
second century AD, explained that all of (private) 
law revolved around just three notions: person 
(persona), thing (res) and action (actio).1 Then 
when, say, one person buys something (res) from 
another person, we have contract or something like 
it. Gaius distinguished various kinds of contract. 
Yet, like other Roman lawyers, he did not try to 
base contract on any general philosophical account 
– say, of promise or of will.
 But the medieval version of Roman law, a theo-
retically much more sophisticated affair, attempted 
to produce a general account of why contracts are 
binding. And the answer lay in consent. This idea 
was not in itself new. What was however novel was 
the claim that consent belonged to the very essence 
of contract. To make such a claim, you need a phil-
osophical theory of essence. This the medieval le-
gal theorists found in the philosophy of Aristotle. 
So, for example, Bartolus developed the concept 
of causa as based on either liberality or exchange.2 
Now a causa was, according to (later) medieval the-
orists, an Aristotelian causa finalis – that is to say, 
the reason something (the making of a contract) 
was done or ought to be done. In fact, the Aristo-
telian final cause had an essentially moral aspect.
 The real breakthrough in providing contract 
with a philosophical foundation came with 
the Thomistic revival in the 16th century (the 
revival of the ideas of St Thomas Aquinas, who 
was himself heavily influenced by Aristotle). 
Law students of our day are probably not aware 
what a monumental contribution to legal theory 
was made by this Second Scholastic movement 
(Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Luis de 
Molina, Francisco Suarez and various others).3
Law students of our day are probably 
not aware what a monumental 
contribution to legal theory was made 
by the Second Scholastic movement
What they argued, as James Gordley summarizes 
the matter,4 was that the binding force of contracts 
was to be analyzed ‘in terms of the Aristotelian and 
Thomistic virtues of promise-keeping, commuta-
tive justice, and liberality’. Note here the use of the 
term virtues. Bartolus’ doctrine of the two varieties 
of causa was now glossed as the claim that every 
contract was to be classified as either gratuitous 
or onerous, ‘as made either causa gratuita or causa 
onorosa’.5 There were disagreements between 16th 
century legal philosophers on many details. The 
general line of their argument is however clear.
 But in the 17th century, the whole edifice of 
scholasticism – not just in legal theory, but in 
much more general intellectual terms – came 
under ever greater pressure. This was the century 
of the moderns – Descartes in France, Hobbes 
and Locke in England and many more anti-
Aristotelians and anti-scholastics. To put the matter 
in simple terms, the modern philosophers did not 
want to base anything on what they regarded as 
unacceptably dogmatic theological notions. So, 
in respect of legal theory, they began to drop the 
moral or virtue account of contract.6
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the will theory
By the 19th century, systematic attempts 
were being made to rid law of ‘out-dated’ and 
theologically-oriented, that is to say, specifically 
Christian, references. Thus many leading legal 
thinkers wanted not just a contract theory purged 
of religion, but even one purged of all metaphysics. 
The only or best possibility seemed to be to 
redefine contract in terms of will – the will of the 
parties entering into the contract. If, say, two or 
more parties voluntarily, i.e. out of their own free 
will, enter into a legal agreement, then who is to 
say that this agreement is not in itself valid and 
binding? Gordley remarks that the will theory was 
thus useful to 19th century economic liberals, who 
– for obvious reasons connected with their private 
economic interests – held ‘that government should 
leave economic decisions to the market-place’ and 
should not concern itself with problems of justice. 
The problem was however that the new account 
‘entangled [its champions] in difficulties they were 
never able to resolve’. Or, to put it another way: 
‘We can have a theory of contract, but to do so 
we need the very concepts that the 19th century 
jurists threw out.’7
 In short: the will theory does not work. It does 
not explain why some choices – that is to say, some 
meetings of the will of two or more persons – are 
nevertheless not accepted as establishing a valid or 
binding contractual agreement. For example, we 
are not permitted to sell ourselves into slavery.
 In the light of this difficulty, one can (if one is 
a will theorist) do two things – either admit that 
the will theory is deficient; or attempt to rewrite 
the law to bring it into line with a consequent 
will-based approach. The first option was taken 
by most legal thinkers. They dropped the will 
theory, at least in serious academic analyses. The 
second approach was often taken by ideologists. 
That we cannot sell ourselves into slavery, or 
properly contract to perform actions which have 
been regarded over the centuries as immoral, and 
that some contracts, requiring the performance of 
such actions, are therefore unenforceable in law, 
is on this view wrong because inconsequent. The 
law ought to allow us to sell ourselves into slavery; 
and, say, prostitution should be regarded as a 
‘profession like any other’, to which a government 
Job Centre may legitimately direct seekers after 
work, to be formalized in a regular labour contract; 
and so on.
 Aside from a few incorrigible neo-liberal 
propagandists – of whom by the way quite a 
number are now to be found in government – 
no one seriously accepts this second view. But if 
we instead take the first position, namely that the 
will theory of contract must be dropped, what 
remains of our understanding of the foundations 
of contract?
 Nothing much. There is at present no adequate 
philosophical account of the bases of contract. 
For some lawyers that does not matter: they do 
not care. This tendential abandonment of serious 
consideration of such matters may, at least to a 
certain extent, be tempered – or rather: rendered 
less obvious – by a pragmatic attachment to an (in 
fact equally dogmatic) legal positivism: contract is 
just what the law book says it is. Why the legislator 
defined it thus in the law book remains a mystery. 
After all, the legislator has no coherent theory 
either.
If we take the position that the will 
theory of contract must be dropped, 
what remains of our understanding of 
the foundations of contract?
the soCial ContraCt
Let us now see how this curious and unsatisfactory 
situation works itself out in the field of political 
theory. The reader will be well aware that one of 
the great political dogmas of the modern age is 
what is generally known as social contract theory 
(the pactum societatis). This holds, roughly, that the 
existence and authority of any social collectivity – 
including the state – may be regarded as legitimate 
only to the extent that its members have severally 
agreed to transfer to this collectivity their personal 
rights and freedoms. Well-known proponents of 
this doctrine, or at least of one or another of its 
variants, are Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Samuel 
von Pufendorf, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and, much 
more recently, John Rawls. 
 It is, in our own day, an immensely popular 
theory. Yet it also suffers from a crucial weakness. 
The Czech philosopher Jan Sokol writes for example 
as follows: ‘One important strain of juridical and 
political thought, leading from Hobbes, Grotius 
and Rousseau up to John Rawls, seeks the source 
of law and rights in the social contract. This might 
appear to be a clever solution, until one realizes 
that a contract itself is a juridical notion and 
7 Gordley, a.w., chapter 7 and Conclusion.
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thus presupposes the existence of law’ – that is 
to say, the making of a contract presupposes the 
very framework of contractual obligation whose 
binding status it seeks to establish.8
The social contract theory is, in our own 
day, an immensely popular theory.  
Yet it also suffers  
from a crucial weakness
And yet this view of politics and society remains, 
in the 21st century, overwhelmingly influential. 
Why? Probably for reasons not of evidence or logic 
but rather of political ideology. To put the matter 
(too) bluntly: there are massive political, social 
and economic interests whose operations are most 
effectively justified by reference to such a dogma, 
and more specifically to the version based on an 
appeal to individual free will. In the terminology 
of Antonio Gramsci, social contract theory, in this 
sense, is presently hegemonic.
 But we can broaden our critical analysis. What 
is hegemonic is not just social contract theory, but 
more generally what may be called contractualism. 
Here is what I wrote about this topic in my Leiden 
inaugural:9
‘Contemporary contractualism (...) exploits a modern 
notion of contract. What defines this notion? James 
Gordley demonstrated [as we saw] (...) that the evolution 
of the modern idea of contract was accompanied by a 
“doctrinal crisis”. For jurists had abandoned the Aristotelian 
and medieval philosophical foundations of contract theory 
without rebuilding “the edifice they had razed”. [For a 
time] the will became the central explanatory but also 
legitimating element in the new doctrine.
 You may recall that Sir Henry Maine, author of Ancient 
Law, wrote in 1861 about a “movement of the progressive 
societies (…) from Status to Contract”. But his thought 
is more complex than this slogan suggests. What is often 
forgotten is that, though Maine was an admirer of Roman 
law, he insisted (in his chapter on “The Early History of 
Contract”) that the views of the Roman lawyers were 
“inconsistent with the true history of moral and legal 
progress”. But worse: much later, in modern times, the 
language of the Roman lawyers became “the language 
of an age which had lost the key to their [the Romans’] 
mode of thought” – in other words, law, in the technical 
sense, had become disjoined from the underlying legal and 
intellectual culture. Worse still, in Maine’s view, was the 
example offered by the modern Social Contract theorists: 
“It was”, he writes, “for the purpose (…) of gratifying 
their speculative tastes by attributing all jurisprudence to 
a uniform source (…) that they devised the theory that 
all Law had its origin in contract” – this theory being in 
fact a mere “legal superstition”. Interesting and relevant 
is also Maine’s description in the same chapter of early 
feudal society, which was, he suggests, bound together 
precisely by the tie of contract – in contrast, we might say, 
to the modern, State-based polity. Thus Maine indirectly 
anticipates the recent critique of the contractualization of 
society, namely that this latter involves (...) a kind of re-
feudalization of social relations.’
The reason we can speak in this connection of 
a re-feudalization of society is that, for a truly 
consequent contractualist, there is nothing special 
about the association called the sovereign state 
– on the contrary: in principle (if not entirely 
in practice) human individuals can establish any 
number of ‘clubs’, none of which – not even 
‘Nederland BV’ (as this phrase in fact implies) – 
has any special claim to authority over any other. 
There are numberless, big and little, ‘organizing’ 
and ‘rule-making’ centres. This doctrine is 
sometimes referred to by the name ‘theory of 
governance’.
ContraCtualism and anthropology
In his important recent work, Alain Supiot writes 
of contractualism as ‘an ideology according to 
which no human being may be subjected to any 
other limits than those which he freely establishes 
for himself ’. This ideology however fails to account 
for the most elementary truths of anthropology, 
that is to say, of how human beings are socialized 
by and operate in an institutional collectivity.10
 Let me therefore step outside legal theory proper 
for a moment, and quote once again some of my 
own words, but now on the relation between the 
contractualist ideology on the one hand and some 
crucial anthropological and psychological realities 
on the other.
 For instance, I noted in an earlier piece, ‘Freud 
writes that during the narcissistic stage in human 
development the little child imagines himself – 
because that is how the world and especially his 
parents treat him – to be the centre of the universe, 
monarch of all he surveys, owing allegiance to 
no one and to nothing: “He shall (...) be the centre 
and core of creation – His Majesty the Baby, as we 
once fancied ourselves”, says Freud. In this sense 
the [phenomenon of narcissism] already has a 
“political” dimension.’ Pierre Legendre, emeritus 
professor of law at the University of Paris, suggests 
that it is specifically ‘contemporary contractualist 
8 In a lecture recently given in the Netherlands, entitled ‘Are 
Human Rights Natural?’.
9 G.E. Lock, Oikoumenes promachoi, Leiden: Universiteit Leiden 
2003.
10 A. Supiot, Homo juridicus: Essai sur la fonction anthropologique 
du droit, Paris: Editions du Seuil 2005, p. 114-115.
041 Mens en Maatschappij Lock.in450   450 18-4-2007   9:52:03
 AA 56 (2007)  5    451
Mens en Maatschappij | M
E
N
S E
N
 M
A
A
T
SC
H
A
P
P
IJ |
ideology’ which encourages a generalized social 
regression to such narcissism. ‘For is not each of 
us repeatedly told, by the mass media and by the 
commercial advertising industry, by educational 
institutions and even by government, that he or 
she is the legitimate source and origin of all his 
“preferences” or “choices”, on the basis of course 
of his own freely adopted “values”? Thus [on this 
view] no allegiance is demanded of the individual 
to anything outside of himself. In present-
day contractualist society, each of us is a little 
monarch’; indeed, he is what might unkindly be 
termed a little moral megalomaniac.11
Contract is a strange thing.  
It is an age-old idea and practice, 
presumed to be irreplaceable  
in human interaction, and yet  
its modern and post-modern variants  
present immensely problematic aspects
ContraCtualism today
The Leiden legal philosopher Andreas Kinneging 
makes a comment relevant to this point (one 
on which I remarked in a review of his book). 
‘Marriage’, he writes, ‘is nowadays regarded “as 
a contract like any other”’. Now the logic of this 
view, which presently enjoys a near monopoly in 
the Western world, in academic theory but also 
in practical political life, is (Kinneging adds) that 
‘the only thing which matters is the agreement 
of the parties’. So none of the traditional virtues 
associated with marriage any longer applies. The 
logic is that people should be able to negotiate 
any kind of ‘marriage’, irrespective of gender or 
numbers (two, three or more) and the like. In 
fact we already have same-sex marriage, and may 
soon have group marriage, fixed-term marriage, 
parttime marriage and so on. ‘If all these things 
have not yet been completely incorporated into 
the positive law of the western world’, the author 
writes, ‘that is only because the traditional view of 
marriage and the family has not yet been entirely 
ousted from the law. But we can expect that it will 
not be long before this happens.’12 Is it not all just 
a matter of free contractual agreement between 
sovereign individuals?
 Contract, I suggested, is a strange thing. It 
is an age-old idea and practice, presumed to be 
irreplaceable in human interaction. And yet 
its modern and post-modern variants present 
immensely problematic aspects, both for law and 
for social and political life generally.
 I don’t know whether lawyers and law students 
of our time are mindful of this. But it is something 
that we ought to think – and perhaps to worry 
– about.
11 G.E. Lock, ‘Dogma, Heresy and Voluntary Servitude: from 
the Second Millennium to the Third’, Episteme: Revista 
Multidisciplinar da Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, 2001-7,8,9, 
p. 9-28. Cf. Sigmund Freud, ‘Zur Einführung des Narzissmus’, 
Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse 1914, p. 1-24; Pierre Legendre, Le 
Désir politique de Dieu. Étude sur les montages de l’État et du 
droit, Paris: Fayard 1988 and Sur la question dogmatique en 
Occident. Aspects théoriques, Paris: Fayard 1999.
12 A.A.M. Kinneging, Geografie van goed en kwaad. Filosofische 
essays, Utrecht: het Spectrum 2005, p. 196-198.
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